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On September 29th, 1889 the Agent to the Govr. of Vizagapatam District  in the Madras 
Presidency received a letter from the Agent to the Govr. in Ganjam “requesting to let him 
know the extent of the land which has been under Jeypore and has come to the Gumma 
Bissoyi by the recent demarcation of the boundary and about the sist paid by the Sowrahs 
to Jeypore for the land”.1 This letter is only the first in a series of documents which show 
how the decision to demarcate the boundary line at that particular spot was the cause for a 
series  of  conflicts  involving  the  Gumma  Bissoyi  as  a  subordinate  of  the  Parlakimedi 
Zamindar,  various groups of  villagers,  such as  the Kondh and Savara  people  of  several 
muṭhās,  the administrations of  Jeypur and Parlakimedi,  and various British Agents  and 
Border Commissioners. All this was the consequence of the decision of a British boundary 
commission to define a border line according to seemingly rational and scientific criteria, 
namely a line which “follows certain strongly marked natural features”.2 But in doing so, 
they disregarded the traditional land rights and status claims of the people living in that 
border area or from the land in question.
The custom in the hilly areas of Orissa used to be that those who settled a previously 
unpopulated or abandoned tract of land had to pay taxes to the head of the political body 
from which the settlers came. Thus, when Kondhs who were under the authority of Baudh 
abandoned certain tracts in the border region adjacent to the Chinna Kimedi Maliāhs of 
Ganjam, Kondhs from Chinna Kimedi moved in, cleared the forest and settled. They even 
relocated some of the villages after a short period of time because there were outbreaks of 
smallpox in the original villages. These new Kondh settlers were clearly of the opinion that 
due to their allegiance to Chinna Kimedi, the land revenue now belonged to Chinna Kimedi. 
Older  claims  were  forfeited  with  the  abandonment  of  the  land by the  previous  Baudh 
Kondhs. This idea, however, was strongly opposed by the Baudh Diwan who sent troops in 
who “planted flags in villages” in order to mark them as theirs.3
This incident, only one among many similar boundary conflicts found in the archival 
1 Orissa State Archives, Ganjam District Records, 2471G/451, 26 Sept. 1889.
2 Orissa State Archives, Ganjam District Records, 1682G, 8 May 1880.
3 Orissa State Archives, Ganjam District Records, 1429G, 24 Nov. 1870.
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records  of  Ganjam  District  and  other  sources,  shows  the  fluidity  of  borders  in  the 
traditional states of the area. Chinna Kimedi claims in this case rights over the land because 
their Kondhs had cleared the forest and settled there. In the Mackenzie Collection of the 
Government Oriental Manuscripts Library in Chennai, there is a text about the Zamindars 
of Tekkali in which again the clearing of the forest and the building of temples makes a 
piece of land the property of the settlers and their overlords, but this text also describes 
the killing of the original inhabitants to clear the land for the newcomers.4 Here we can see 
that even before the time of the British, border conflicts were fairly often violent affairs.
But the archives reveal another story as well. In the late 19th century, the people of the 
hills of Orissa were subjected to a border regime which was new to them. The border was 
suddenly a line, and hill peasants, who had been left virtually alone with themselves and 
their  Bissoyis  and  Muṭhādārs  for  centuries,  suddenly  came  under  close  scrutiny  of  a 
political authority they did not understand. What was merely an administrative act in the 
eyes of the revenue authorities, namely the making of such a harmless thing as a border 
line, very often cut in half areas whose inhabitants had a strong emotional tie to each other 
and to their political leader in the area, such as a Patro, Bissoyi, Muṭhādār or Zamindar. 
With the new border line, they suddenly found themselves the subjects of a king or revenue 
officer  who was not  the one they perceived to  be their  legitimate ruler.  Naturally,  the 
people who were subject to this change did resist. The archival records show that dozens of 
small rebellions and scores of court cases resulted from these abstract decisions. So, while 
the new British border lines undoubtedly did some good and helped to reduce the burden 
of taxes and forced labour the villagers had to shoulder, they created problems in the world 
view of the people and left them insecure in a new world which was incomprehensible for 
them.
Boundaries are a part of our daily lives. They are part of our society, they are crucial for 
defining our identities, but they are also the source of many of our conflicts. We encounter 
boundaries wherever we go, obvious ones, and more subtle ones. When we enter a house, 
we  might  first  have  to  open a  gate  in  a  garden fence  and then cross  a  threshold.  We 
encounter signs and symbols demarcating property, city limits and sacred places, and we 
react to them by changing our behaviour accordingly, since it is ingrained into us to do so. 
Even an intruder will change his behaviour once he is going to violate such a boundary, 
because he will become self-conscious about the act he is about to commit. Boundaries both 
limit and define our social identity. They can be symbols of social inequality, as used to be 
the case in South Africa and in formerly racially segregated states in the south of the USA, 
4 The  Tṛkkali-tālūkā  Jamīṃdārla-vaṃśāvali,  a  Telugu text  of  the  Mackenzie  Collection,  Chennai, 
states that the rulers of Tekkali were subordinate to the King of Parlakimedi and that old border 
conflicts  of  the  18th  century  between  Tarla  and  Tekkali  were  brought  before  the  king 
(Berkemer 1997).
– 2 –
where black people were not allowed to become members of certain clubs, ride on certain 
buses,  go  to  certain  schools  or  rest  rooms.  In  a  less  degrading  way  such  separating 
boundaries are to be found everywhere: if you do not wear the right clothes, you are not 
allowed to enter a fancy hotel or night club, if you have the wrong skin colour or the wrong 
kind of beard, you cannot enter the Jagannath temple in Puri, if you wear prison clothes, 
you cannot just walk out of a penitentiary. I am quoting these random examples to show 
how closely related boundaries and social identities are. The body social, a term used by the 
anthropologist  Emile  Durkheim,  is  in  many ways defined by boundaries  that  designate 
social space.
Many of us may have had a very strange and somewhat unsettling experience with that 
kind of boundary, which is in modern times the single most important one for all of us: the 
border line of a sovereign state. When we come near to a state border, especially one of the 
highly  marked  and  guarded  kind,  something  very  peculiar  happens:  we  start  feeling 
differently.  Something  “is  in  the  air”.  Surroundings  change  subtly,  the  tension  rises, 
insecurity mounts. Imagine a border such as the one between North and South Korea and 
the one that formerly existed between East and West Germany, or those between India and 
Pakistan and the USA and Mexico. Imagine the fences, the border patrols with their dogs, 
the watch towers, the armed vehicles and helicopters, and in the cases of the most severely 
guarded border lines, the no-man’s-land, the mine fields, the tanks, the heavy guns and 
missile batteries.
The  body  social,  that  is,  the  extension  of  our  physical  body  into  the  social  world, 
shrinks in the face of such a formidable threat even before anything actually happens to us 
at the border. We begin to feel small and self-conscious. Our very identity as autonomous 
beings, secure in our social surroundings, is challenged. And when we go to the border 
check point, the body social recedes to the limits of our physical body. Suddenly we feel our 
skin  being  exposed  to  the  outer  world.  There  is  no  shell  left  to  protect  us  from  a 
threatening  environment  that  is  bound  to  overwhelm  us.  We  become  reduced  to  our 
physical  body  and even though we intellectually  know  that  we  are  in  no  real  danger, 
feelings of insecurity and oppressiveness tell us otherwise. We are subjected to scrutiny by 
people who speak a foreign language and have strange ways of behaviour. They poke into 
our private lives, open our suitcases and go through our papers. They virtually pry open 
our innermost selves, and we can never be sure what they actually know about us from 
their files and computers. We are deprived of the agency over our own lives. Crossing such 
a border means to give away a part of our identity and to be attributed a partly new one. 
We are no longer secure in the feeling of being at home in our own country, we have been 
made foreigners.
The emotional side of the relation between borders and identities has to my knowledge 
been outlined best by the German philosopher, Hermann Schmitz, who in his multi-volume 
System der Philosophie (System of Philosophy) has put forth a world view which starts not 
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with the intellect, but with the feelings and senses of the body. This deeper-lying level of 
perception  is  in  my  opinion  the  key  to  understanding  emotions  connected  with  the 
“atmosphere” of the border area. The insecurity I described is felt collectively, even though 
the border puts its mark on each individual separately. This oppressive atmosphere of the 
border is more than a trivial emotion. It is a shared sentiment.
Now you will probably ask yourselves what all this has to do with Orissa? To answer this 
question, please allow me one more extempore, this time into methodology. I am a strong 
advocate  of  the  comparative  method  in  social  sciences.  I  believe  that  paradigmatic 
examples are useful to illustrate a point and to make clear that social phenomena can be 
understood by using a three-step cognitive process. First, we collect a set of data from one 
case, then construct a model which describes the case in question in a more general way, 
and finally test this model with the data from other cases. This has been done successfully 
in the field of history – to use only examples close to our present topic – by Burton Stein 
and his segmentary state model and by Bernard Cohn and Nicholas Dirks with the model of 
the little kingdom. Both are describing certain aspects of traditional state society in South 
Asia.
With the same method in mind, borders can be studied from various angles. They are 
phenomena  which  are  of  a  political  as  well  as  a  symbolic  nature.  Political  science, 
administrative science, geography, anthropology, history, psychology and philosophy are 
concerned with boundaries, physical as well as mental.
Doing this kind of research in the context of border disputes in Southern Orissa brings 
together especially two separate fields of research – the history of the formation of borders 
on the one hand, and the research on construction of collective notions of identity on the 
other. Borders have in the past been the object of research from various angles, and we can 
learn  a  lot  from such studies  for  our  area.  It  can  be  inferred  from such analyses  that 
identities and borders have a reciprocal  relationship (Bennett 1980; Gardner 1982). Col­
lective  identities  can  be  the  reason  for  the  creation  of  borders,  first  symbolically  or 
culturally,  later  also  politically;  conversely,  borders  can  also  create  new  identities  and 
weaken or destroy older ones, thus bringing forth double or multiple sets of – often con­
flicting – identities. The creation of the state border between Orissa and the Madras state in 
1936 and the subsequent creation of Andhra Pradesh as a Telugu speaking state is such a 
case of a process where cultural identities and state boundaries were in a kind of feedback 
relationship with each other.
Disputes in colonial times can be a source of information for such issues, because the 
colonial process forms political units regardless of older identities, or solidifies traditional 
border regions (sīma in Oriya) into border lines (sīmānta). The traditional Indian state which 
is – in Stanley Tambiah’s words – based on the idea of a “center-oriented space” is replaced 
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by the colonialist notion of the state as “bounded space” (Tambiah 1985). Such changes in 
the fundamental workings of the state are reflected in administrative proceedings (Dirks 
1985, 1986) and inevitably involve claims to territory which one of the parties concerned 
“owns” in the colonial  present and over which another party claims to have legitimate 
rights  established  in  the  precolonial  past.  Violations  of  boundaries  are  considered  as 
violations of privileges given by superiors, and therefore as violations of status and identity 
connected  with  a  particular  tract  of  land.  My colleague  B.  Schnepel,  now  Professor  of 
Anthropology at Halle, Germany, has illustrated this constellation from an anthropological 
point of view, and in the context of one particular case, that of “Thatrāja of Bissamcuttack 
v. Mahārāja of Jeypore” (Schnepel 1994, 1995, 1997, 2001) , in which the Thatrāja claims 
sovereign  rights  over  his  Zamindari,  even though it  used to  be a  sāmanta kingdom of 
Jeypore. A similar case is the one filed by the Mahārāja of Jeypore against the relatives of 
his former subordinate, the Zamindar of Madugula. Here the Mahārāja wanted to revoke 
the patta on the grounds that the Madugula king had died without issue and the lease was 
lapsed. The British authorities opposed this, of course.
In the context of Orissa, considerable work has been done on the transition process 
from  traditional  identities  via  the  image  of  modern  all-encompassing  nationhood  into 
administrative boundaries, i.  e.  how a certain cultural  identity took shape as a political 
entity. One major focus of these studies is the Oriya movement which is a good example of 
how the process of creating a cultural identity can be a driving force for the inclusion of 
various political entities into one unified state (Berkemer 2001; Mohanty 1982).
In this context the border of Parlakimedi has to be given special attention. Not only was 
the border between Jeypur and Parlakimedi one of the most prominent border areas, and 
simultaneously the district border between Koraput and Ganjam, but it was also the border 
between sub-units of the kingdoms of Jeypur and Parlakimedi. There are documents avail­
able for at least three levels of conflict across this border, i. e. between villages, between 
muṭhās, and between the zamindaries themselves. They reach from petty disputes over one 
or a few fields or acres of forest land between two villages at the border of a revenue unit to 
long-lasting  conflicts  and  lawsuits  across  the  district  boundaries  between  the  largest 
political units of the area.
There are maps available which give us the approximate extent of the zamindaries in 
early British times. Here, we find examples of how  sīma-areas, especially in the form of 
formerly subordinate land-holdings such as Gunupur, Tarla and Tekkali and tribal lands of 
the maliāhs, are converted into administrative units by the colonial power. The reaction of 
the holders of the privileges connected with the land is foreseeable: there was a prolonged 
resistance against the British administration. Even in the 1920s the Raja of  Parlakimedi 
sued the government of  Madras  Presidency  to  give  him administrative  rights  over  the 
Kimedi Maliāhs.5
5 E.g. Orissa State Archives, District Records, Ganjam Dist., Rec 2991G, 2998G, 3220G etc.
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A further step into the direction towards the formation of the modern border lines of 
the present Indian federal states is also connected with Parlakimedi. About two thirds of 
Part II of the First Schedule, which is appended to the Constitution of Orissa of 1936, are 
necessary to describe this rather short piece of the border line in the south of the Ganjam 
and Gajapati Districts.6 It had to be done in this way because the Parlakimedi Zamindari was 
the only estate divided along village boundaries between Orissa and a neighbouring state 
(Berkemer  2001).  As  a  result,  parts  of  the  ritual  landscape  of  the  old  kingdom (Patha­
patnam, Mukhalingam) are now in Andhra, while Parlakimedi town and the northern part 
of the zamindari belong to Orissa. Here we come across the most striking example of a 
border cutting old ties and establishing new identities besides the slowly fading older ones.
Let us now take a look back into the time before the modern border lines were defined. The 
lord of the sīma or border area is the paradigmatic little king. Where the great king has no 
authority because he cannot penetrate due to cultural or military limitations, the little king 
is the sovereign ruler. In an economy adapted to the hardships of the mountainous land 
which is based mostly on subsistence agriculture yielding only a meagre surplus, no large 
body of non-producing specialists can be maintained. Everything is small and, seen from 
the  point  of  view  of  a  great  king,  not  worth  to  be  conquered.  But  nonetheless,  this 
miniature replica of a Hindu kingdom is a political reality throughout South Asia and much 
more common than the great empires. Such small states populate the vast border areas of 
the traditional Indian states.
The kingdom of the sīma-kings is in many ways a smaller replica of the big kingdom. An 
ambitious little king can become the ruler of an empire by strengthening his power base 
through alliances, through conquest of surplus-yielding territory, and by building up an 
infrastructure consisting of forts,  temples and service land holdings for Brahmanas and 
peasant-militia. This will inevitably draw him closer to the big rice-producing plains, for 
they alone  can  sustain a  large  body  of  specialized non-agriculturists  as  is  required  for 
maintaining a Hindu state. Here we come across the most important difference between 
centre and sīma: their economic bases are unequal, thus either luring the little kings to the 
centre as conquerors or high officials, or making the central power reach out to subdue the 
weaker kings who make a nuisance of themselves. And there are other differences. Since 
the times of the Cola emperors, the great state temple is the ritual centre of the empire and 
a centre of  pilgrimage,  and acts as an integrating factor  for  many social  groups in the 
empire. The rulers of the sīma have their tutelary deity in their mud forts, but due to their 
usual indigenous origin their sacred centre is very often in the hills, in the form of an un-
iconic Ṭhakurāṇī or a Maṇikeśvari. While this original deity does not receive daily pūjā and 
6 The Government of India (Constitution of Orissa) Order, 1936, first schedule, part II, “The Land 
Boundary  of  Orissa,”  p.  8-9  (British  Library,  Oriental  and  India  Office  Collections,  Official 
Records, P&J (C) 6229, p. 41-48).
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aṅga-raṅga-bhoga and is worshipped according to the festival calender of the non-Hindu 
population of the hills, the second and ‘civilized’  avatār is present in or nearby the king’s 
palace in the form of a Kanaka Durgā or Paidatalli, and maybe also as a Kālī. Here regular 
daily rituals, often conducted by Brahmin priests, are the rule. The temples, however, are 
less elaborate and look very different from the ones found in the plains.
This pattern is repeated on an ever smaller scale on all levels of rulership and ends at 
the village level, as I was able observe in Koraput District, where the  hundi of the village 
goddess in the centre of the settlement stands in opposition to the Patkhaṇḍā, Bhairavī or 
Ṭhakūrānī outside, in the liminal zone which does not quite belong to the village.  This 
outer  area  is  the sphere  of  the spirits  of  the  deceased,  and from here  Patkhaṇḍa-type 
goddesses guard the boundaries against sinister forces from outside. One can say that each 
village has its own sīma. This liminal area, and not the boundary line, is of ritual importance 
for the village people. It is the liminal area between the  kṣetra or cultivated land and the 
vana (Claus 1978, Sontheimer 1994), the place of the evil  forces that have to be kept in 
check. As related by Verrier Elvin in several of his books, whoever enters a village from 
outside inevitably carries some of the forces of this  outer world into the village and is 
therefore a source of potential danger. Thus the boundary transforms a person. The little 
king or village chief becomes, as soon as he crosses the sīma between his area of authority 
and the neighbouring  ones,  a  bandit  leader who robs villagers  of  their  cattle and who 
challenges the authority of another leader (Shulman 1980).
This is traditional politics of the Arthaśāstra-type on a micro-level. As André Wink has 
made clear, pre-modern Indian politics was characterized by its competitive and dynamic 
elements. There was a constant forging, breaking and realigning of political alliances, and 
this has to be considered as basic to the art of statecraft in India (Wink 1986: 6). We find this 
dynamic reflected in the archival records of the nineteenth century, but we can also safely 
assume that the British authorities of that time were not aware of it. In the old regime, 
borders are inevitably the regions of equal, i.e. usually equally weak, influence from the 
great  centres.  The  actual  “line  of  control”  might  change  every  year  with  the  military 
campaigns or strengths and weaknesses of individual rulers, as it is well documented in the 
case of the Vijayanagar empire and its wars against the Deccan Sultans and the Gajapatis of 
Orissa. It is also possible that the sīma grows and shrinks, depending on the military power 
and skill of governance displayed by a ruler.
There is a famous case of such dynamic, almost pulsating border regions in the history 
of Southern Orissa. As documented in the  Māḍalā Pāñjī, Kapilendra Gajapati, after having 
staged his coup d’état against the last Gaṅga king, Bhānudeva IV in 1434, lost almost all his 
territories south of Mahandragiri. These border territories were lost not due to the inroads 
of  a  foreign  enemy,  but  due  to  the  insubordination  of  traditional  sāmānta-kings,  the 
subordinate rulers who traditionally governed the less accessible tracts of  mountainous 
and forested  land.  Some little  kings  had already rebelled  against  the  weak Bhānudeva, 
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others  tried  to  gain  sovereignty  or  started  to  seek  new  alliances  after  the  coup.  The 
Sanskrit rendering of the  Māḍala Pañjī,  the  Kaṭakarājavaṃśāvali,  and some of Kapilendra’s 
inscriptions  describe  the  situation  from  the  precarious  first  years  as  a  king  up  to  his 
reconquest of the suddenly very large sīma area between his kingdom and the Reḍḍis who 
ruled the Krishna-Godavari delta. An inscription from Bhubaneswar7 dated 1436 AD shows 
what was in store for the rebels when Kapilendra threatens that “if any engage in what is 
not beneficial  to the king,  he is to be banished from the kingdom and all  his  property 
confiscated”.
Exactly  that  happened.  Kapilendra  and his  son  PuruÒottama confiscated  land  from 
older  ruling families and established new allies  in the place of  the rebels.  Many ruling 
families of the 20th century came into power at that time (Berkemer 1993: 325-30),  the 
Nandapur kingdom passed from the Śilavaṃśa line into the hands of the Jayavaṃśa, and 
inscriptional evidence from Siṃhācalam shows that the traditional Gaṅga allies ceased to 
exist (Berkemer 1993:  179-202).  Identities and allegiances were destroyed and new ones 
created.  So  far,  a  parallel  to  the  situation  in  the  19th century  is  discernible.  There  is, 
however,  a  big  difference  as  well:  while  in  the  case  of  Kapilendra’s  and Puruṣottama’s 
reforms and reconquests the pattern remained the same, i.e. the names of the little kings 
changed,  but  the  character  of  the  sīma remained,  the  British  began  a  process  which 
ultimately destroyed the sīma and created the  sīmānta, the border line, and thus changed 
the identity of those who lived in the border areas.
The border area as sīma was once a cultural filter, an area not only of overlapping identities 
at  the edges  of  the gravitational  fields  of  the cultural  centres,  but also  a  repository of 
multiple, independent small identities. Some ideas of the coastal plains were adopted, some 
changed and put into new contexts, others rejected. The same was true with influences 
from Bastar and the Central Indian plains. The inhabitants of the Ghats and mountains of 
Southern  Orissa  had their  own cultures,  religions,  languages  and identities.  They  were 
neither Oriya nor Telugu, neither Rājput nor Reḍḍi. Their focus was their village and its 
neighbourhood. Their  identity  was defined by their  local  caste  group or  tribe,  by their 
language and market town, by their Naik and Muṭhādār. They had their own lingua franca, 
the Desya, which is close enough to Coastal Oriya to be called a dialect, but as in the case of 
High German and Bavarian, a person who knows one of them will not be able to understand 
the other. Theirs was a small world, but they were secure within. Their conflicts had their 
own logic and all the hardship in their lives did not deprive them of their identity. Their 
body social existed in an atmosphere of, let me say, shared and well known insecurity.
Now,  in  modern  times,  all  this  has  changed.  The  British  administration  started  to 
mutate the  sīma into segments of larger administrative units.  Sīma became  sīmānta,  and 
soon a  cultural  divide.  People  lost  their  identity  as  groups  living  in  the  border  region 
7 Tripathi (1962), inscription no. 12.
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between two centres, where they did belong to neither one nor the other. Their identity, 
simple as it may have been, left them autonomous as a group, and gave them the character 
of typical “border-people” from the point of view of the centres. An anthropologist would 
ascribe to them a definite identity in its own right. It is theirs, created by themselves and 
used autonomously, and as long as they had this identity, they were the agents of their own 
fate. When their area became divided by a border line, everything changed. Administrators 
from far away centres now collect data, build infrastructure and interact with them in an 
atmosphere  of  mutual  misunderstanding.  The  border  people  are  given  a  new  identity 
defined by  the  centre,  but  since  they  do  not  conform  to  the  centrist  norms,  they  are 
considered a deviation.  Their  customs,  language,  religion is  suppressed,  most  often not 
even deliberately and with the best intentions,  due to a value system which sees their 
culture as defective and in need of an overhaul.
The bounded space of the modern administrative units claims all citizens to be equal 
within the borders. However, in reality the former special identity of the inhabitants of the 
sīma is reduced to that of a second class citizens, deficient in their urbanity, rustics who 
cannot  correctly  speak  the  state  language  and  who behave  shamefully  in  their  eating 
habits, drinking rituals and love life. The world is full of novels and movies based on this 
theme. Some of them, like Kazantzakis’ Alexis Sorbas or Garcia-Marquez’ One Hundred Years  
of Solitude describe such eccentric characters from the  sīma and rendered them immortal 
literary  figures.  But  usually,  the  border  people  are  not  indomitable  individuals  whose 
shrewdness allows them to triumph over the dangers from the big city. On the contrary: as 
has been described so vividly by Verrier Elvin, when the modern world penetrates the sīma 
areas, the indigenous people soon learn to fear the scorn of the outsiders who mock them 
and leave them with a feeling of emptiness. The border line divides the former  sīma into 
two political units and often cultural regions. On both sides, the pressure to accept foreign 
norms  comes  from  different  centres.  Kinship  groups  are  divided,  traditional  places  of 
pilgrimage are made inaccessible. The people become self-conscious and undergo the same 
mental  process that we feel  when crossing a border.  Their world is ripped apart,  their 
values denigrated and their selves violated.
This process happened and is still happening all over the world. The context was and is 
usually a colonial or national one. It happens in Africa and South America, in Tibet and on 
the Balkans. It happens for instance when nationalist sentiments express themselves in 
slogans such as “one state, one language, one people”. Minorities who not willingly suc­
cumb to such slogans become easily the victims of nationalist suppression. So the Young 
Turks declared the Kurds as “Mountain Turks”, in the Mexican State of Chiapas a civil war 
is fought between indigenous people and big landlords, and only bloody wars between the 
English and the Scottish finally paved the way to a United Kingdom. The formation of a 
united Germany – I mean the first unification in 1871 – was also a case of border violation 
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and formation. The state was announced in Versailles of all places, in the heartland of the 
arch-enemy, France. In all these cases boundaries are created, invaded or destroyed.
A new danger, however, now comes from globalization. I do – by the way – not believe 
in oversimplifications like Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” or in the idea that MTV and 
Coca Cola destroy the cultures of the world. But I see a subtle change in the way people 
perceive themselves. Take for instance TV commercials.  The same message praising the 
good of Pepsi can be seen by people in remote villages in the mountains of Orissa, the Alps 
and the Andes. Some may not know at first who the fat guys are who play soccer against 
David  Beckham  for  a  cooler  of  Pepsi  on  all  Indian  TV  channels,  but  there  is  always 
somebody who can explain what Sumo wrestlers are. Here, one global manufacturer of soda 
pop plays events and figures such as a soccer championship, sports heros and marketable 
traditions of exotic Japan in a way which is believed by the market strategists to be globally 
understandable. It is not, of course. There is some good in this, though, because, trivial as it 
may, such TV commercials open a window to the world for people who otherwise have no 
way out of  their  social  microcosm. Globalization may even give them back part  of  the 
agency which they have lost because they may learn to perceive themselves as part of a 
larger whole in which the people from the regional centre are in no better position than 
they are. Suddenly, whole nations become border areas in which the multinationals act as 
the colonial powers used to in the remote parts of their empires in the time of Imperialism.
This is the rebirth of the sīma on a global scale. We are all actors on an unfamiliar stage. 
We have  to  use  languages  in  which  we cannot  express  ourselves  comfortably,  such  as 
business  English  and  Computerese,  and  we  have  to  perform  strange  rituals,  such  as 
perusing  stock  reports  and operating  an  Automatic  Teller  Machine.  Do  we not  all  feel 
insecure  and  deprived  of  at  least  a  part  of  our  self-esteem  in  the  face  of  such  new 
challenges?  When I  think about such changes in my world,  I  understand how my new 
friends in the villages of Koraput must feel when they come to Bhubaneswar. They feel as 
small  and insecure as I  feel  when standing in line in front of a border checkpoint in a 
foreign country or in front of a computer terminal which has access to data about myself 
which I cannot control. I hope for them and for all of us that the border areas of the world, 
the geographical and social sīma between the national and commercial giants can never be 
reduced to one-dimensional lines which give you only the choice to be one or the other of 
two options. Let us hope that our world will always be a multicultural one, from the level of 
the villages to that of the United Nations.
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